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Abstract—The past century of telecommunications has shown
that failures in networks are prevalent. Although much has been
done to prevent failures, network nodes and links are bound to
fail eventually. Failure recovery processes are therefore needed.
Failure recovery is mainly influenced by (1) detection of the
failure, and (2) circumvention of the detected failure. However,
especially in SDNs where controllers recompute network state
reactively, this leads to high delays. Hence, next to primary
rules, backup rules should be installed in the switches to
quickly detour traffic once a failure occurs. In this work, we
propose algorithms for computing an all-to-all primary and
backup network forwarding configuration that is capable of
circumventing link and node failures. Omitting the high delay
invoked by controller recomputation through preconfiguration,
our proposal’s recovery delay is close to the detection time which
is significantly below the 50 ms rule of thumb. After initial
recovery, we recompute network configuration to guarantee
protection from future failures. Our algorithms use packet-
labeling to guarantee correct and shortest detour forwarding.
The algorithms and labeling technique allow packets to return
to the primary path and are able to discriminate between link and
node failures. The computational complexity of our solution is
comparable to that of all-to-all-shortest paths computations. Our
experimental evaluation on both real and generated networks
shows that network configuration complexity highly decreases
compared to classic disjoint paths computations. Finally, we
provide a proof-of-concept OpenFlow controller in which our
proposed configuration is implemented, demonstrating that it
readily can be applied in production networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern telecommunication networks deliver a multitude
of high-speed communication services through large-scale
connection-oriented and packet-switched networks running on
top of optical networks, Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), cable
connections or even wireless terrestrial and satellite links.
As society heavily depends on modern telecommunication
networks, much has been done to prevent network failure, e.g.,
by improving the equipment environment and physical aspects
of the material. However, the past century of telecommunica-
tions has shown that network components still fail regularly
[1]. Regardless of the preventive protection measures taken,
network nodes and links will eventually malfunction and cease
to function.
In connection-oriented networks, e.g. wavelength-routed
networks, network service interruptions due to the failure of
network nodes or links can often be prevented by assigning at
least two disjoint paths from the source node to the destination
node of each network connection [2]. Connection status is then
monitored from the source node to the destination node. When
the primary path of a network connection fails, the connection
can be reconfigured to use its backup path instead. Traffic can
also be sent on the primary and backup paths of a connection
concurrently, such that reconfiguration upon the failure of the
primary path is not needed. Although finding a pair of (min-
sum) disjoint paths from a source node to a destination node is
polynomially solvable [3], [4], the returned paths may each be
substantially longer than the shortest possible path between the
nodes due to the existence of trap topologies [5]. An alternative
would be to find a pair of min-min disjoint paths, where the
weight of the primary path is to be minimized, instead of the
sum of the weights of both paths (min-sum). However, the
problem will then be NP-hard [6].
Packet-switched networks, e.g., Ethernet or IP networks,
have no connection status since packets are forwarded in
a hop-by-hop manner through local inspection of headers
at each router it traverses. Though using disjoint paths is
possible in packet-switched networks through end-to-end live-
liness detection monitoring schemes (such as Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection (BFD) [7], Ethernet OAM/CFM [8] or
IP Fast Reroute [9]), the approach is more constrained than in
connection-oriented networks.
In packet-switched networks, traffic can be rerouted along
the primary path, which is not possible in connection-oriented
networks. Each intermediate node along the primary path
has the capability of forwarding packets through another link
interface when necessary. Furthermore, after packets have
been rerouted past the failure, packets are directed to the
shortest remaining path towards the destination, possibly by
following the remainder of the (initial) primary path that is un-
affected by the failure. However, configuring such an all-to-all
configuration requires complex forwarding rule constructions,
making manual configuration infeasible. Granular insight into
the network topology is necessary, making it difficult for
traditional distributed routing protocols to derive a correct
steady state. A Software-Defined Networking (SDN) approach
may facilitate implementing such network functionality.
SDN enables the use of a controller for recomputing the
network state reactively upon a failure, but incurs high pro-
cessing delays [10]. In [11], we have shown that failure
recovery in OpenFlow-based SDN networks is best handled in
three steps, being 1) fast failure detection through liveliness
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Figure 1: Failure disjoint paths and labels used in forwarding
monitoring protocols, 2) failure protection through compu-
tation and configuration of backup rules prior to failure,
which is the fastest recovery approach possible but may not
deliver optimal network configuration, and 3) recomputation
of optimal network state and new backup paths as soon as
the failure detection has propagated to the network controller.
Our proposal [11] showed very fast results, but assumed the
configuration of backup rules to be present.
In this paper, we explore existing algorithmic solutions and
propose new ones to compute a network configuration that
guarantees all-to-all network connectivity against any single
node or link failure. Our aim is to be able to automatically
configure and reconfigure any SDN networks with failure
protection schemes without human intervention.
Our contributions in this paper are three-fold:
1) We derive the hard and soft constraints that should be
incorporated by a resilient routing configuration.
2) We present and evaluate algorithms for computing paths
that meet those constraints in circumventing failures.
3) We implement and experiment with the presented algo-
rithms in an SDN controller.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we formally derive a problem statement and give examples
of what we need to compute and how traditional disjoint
paths algorithms fail in doing so. Section III presents our
algorithmic solution for finding failure-disjoint paths, which
we evaluate and analyze in section IV. Our prototype SDN
controller implementation is presented in section V. Section VI
presents related work on finding disjoint paths and computes
their overall complexity when applied to our problem. Finally,
section VII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Figure 1a shows an example of a shortest path through
a sample network, and a link failure between nodes C and
D. Although we are looking for an all-to-all solution, for
illustration purposes we will use the example of traffic flowing
from node H1 to node H2 in the network. The primary path
of the traffic, which is the shortest path, breaks by the failure
of link lCD, an event only noticeable by node C, which is
an intermediate node along the primary path. In order for the
traffic to arrive at node H2, there must be an alternative rule
to revert to at node C that will ultimately route the traffic to
node H2. In essence, we are looking for an all-to-all solution
in which all nodes are preconfigured with backup forwarding
rules to overcome any such single link or node failure in the
network. Moreover, since those rules will be computed for
each possible specific single link/node failure, both the primary
and backup paths will be as short as possible in length, which
is a big gain over standard path disjoint protection schemes.
The problem can be formally defined as follows.
Single Failure Avoidance Rule Assignment (SFARA) prob-
lem: Given a directed network G of a set N of |N | nodes and a
set L of |L| directed links. Each link luv ∈ L connects nodes u
and v, and is characterized by a link weight `uv and a boolean
link status suv indicating link functionality. suv = up implies
that link luv is functioning normally, while suv 6= up implies
that link luv is not functioning. Find an overall set of primary
and backup forwarding rules such that any possible source
node x ∈ N can send packets to any possible destination node
y ∈ N when all links are operational (∀luv ∈ L : suv = up ),
or under a single link (or node) failure (∃!luv ∈ L : suv 6= up).
The following constraints exist for the SFARA problem:
1) The status suv of each link luv ∈ L is only available
from its adjacent nodes u and v, and may be used in
the forwarding logic of nodes u and v. For example,
(suv = up)?(output(luv)) : (output(luw)) describes
the forwarding logic where node u forwards packets to
node v when link luv is operational, or to node w over
link luw otherwise. Node u thereby relies on node w to
have a suitable backup path towards the destination.
2) A set of forwarding actions can be performed on a
packet at each node, including (a) dropping it, (b)
rewriting, adding or removing any of its labels and (c)
forwarding it to the next node by outputting it to a
specific output port or link.
3) The appropriate forwarding actions for each packet are
selected from a forwarding table based on properties
such as: (a) the packet’s incoming port, (b) (wildcard)
matching on packet labels such as its Ethernet addresses,
IP addresses, TCP or UDP source and destination ad-
dress, VLAN tags, MPLS labels, etc., and (c) status of
the outgoing links of the router or switch.
3Algorithm 1 Per-link approach
Input: Adjacency matrix adj = G(N,L)
Output: Forwarding matrix fw containing primary and
backup rules
1: set fw to all-to-all shortest paths matrix
2: for each node n ∈ N
3: for each outgoing link l of n
4: set tAdj to shadow copy of adj
5: remove link l from tAdj
6: set {n′} from N where nextLink = l
7: compute 1-to-{n′} shortest paths from tAdj:
8: store all nextLink as fw[(curNode, l)][n′]
9: return fw
III. PER-FAILURE PRECOMPUTATION FOR AFFECTED
SHORTEST PATHS
As shown earlier in figure 1a, disjoint-path based forwarding
rules cannot instruct node C on how to circumvent the failed
link. Node C can only send the packet back to the source
node through crankback routing, which is an expensive process
since it uses twice the network resources from the source node
to the failed link plus the network resources on the disjoint-
path. Instead, we propose to use a detour around the failure as
shown in figure 1b, optimizing the primary path to the shortest
path whenever possible.
We explain our algorithm for finding and configuring link-
failure disjoint paths using labeling techniques in subsection
III-A, and later modify it to node-failure disjoint paths in
subsection III-B. Knowing whether a link or node failure
has manifested can be difficult since each node can only
determine that an adjacent link is broken, while the failure
may only be limited to the reported link or may include the
adjacent node (and all of its links). A conservative approach
would be to assume that all link-failures imply node failures
as well, but this leads to higher detours and possibly false-
negatives in determining whether there exists a detour path to
the destination node. Subsection III-C thus presents our hybrid
adaptation from the link- and node-failure disjoint paths where
we use a labelling technique to “upgrade” a link-failure to a
node-failure only when necessary, and adapt the forwarding
strategy accordingly. Finally, section III-D discusses how we
optimize routing table complexity by removing redundant
rules.
A. Link-failure disjoint paths
Algorithm 1 presents our algorithm for computing primary
and backup forwarding rules for all possible source-destination
pairs given that at most one link is broken at any time. The
algorithm computes primary and backup forwarding rules for
the whole network, such that it is resilient to any single link
failure. The algorithm first optimizes the length of the primary
path, and then optimizes the length of the detour towards the
destination node for all possible link failures.
Line 1 computes a regular all-to-all shortest paths matrix,
using algorithms such as |N | iterations of Dijkstra’s algorithm
Algorithm 2 Per-node approach, changes compared to algo-
rithm 1 are underlined
Input: Adjacency matrix adj = G(N,L)
Output: Forwarding matrix fw containing primary and
backup rules
1: set fw to all-to-all shortest paths matrix
2: for each node n ∈ N
3: for each outgoing link l of n
4: set tAdj to shadow copy of adj
5: set nR to node opposite of link l
6: remove node nR and adjacent links from tAdj
7: set {n′} from N where next− link = l
8: compute 1-to-{n′} shortest paths from tAdj:
9: store all nextLink as fw[(curNode,nR)][n′]
10: return fw
[12] or the Bellman-Ford algorithm [13], [14], as long as it
supports the link weights in consideration1. Lines 2 and 3
iterate through all nodes’ outgoing links. Since any link con-
nects exactly two nodes this results in a combined complexity
of 2|L|, leading to an intermediate complexity determined
by |N | times the one-to-all shortest paths computations and
O(|L|) for the following procedure. Line 4 creates a shadow
copy of the adjacency matrix, which stores only the changes
from the original. Calls to the shadow copy check for changes
first and if absent return the original result from the original
table. Since we remove at most one link, our shadow copy
suffices to be a function call to the original table that filters
out the one link before looking up the value in the matrix.
Hence, creation and lookup both have a constant complexity.
Line 5 removes the link under evaluation from the shadow
copy which has a complexity of O(1). Line 6 selects all
destinations whose shortest paths go through the removed link.
Sets containing the shortest path destinations denoted per link
can be created within a time complexity contained by any
of the suggested shortest path algorithms and hence does not
add to the overall complexity of the algorithm. Selection of the
sets is done in constant time. Finally, lines 7 and 8 compute
and store the backup paths using a regular one-to-all shortest
paths computation (such as the Dijkstra’s or the Bellman-
Ford algorithms) with a slight change to the stop-criterion.
First, line 7 indicates that the algorithms may stop when all
currently unreachable nodes {n′} have been found again, there
is no need to find the shortest paths to all nodes. Line 8 adds
the found forwarding rules to the original forwarding matrix.
A distinction between the original and backup shortest path
forwarding rules from a node n to its destination forwarding
rules is made by saving it under a label identifying the specific
failure, in this case link l. As presented in figure 1b, the node
that initiates sending packets through backup paths should add
a label identifying the failure it is detouring from. From this
label nodes along the backup path derive that these packets
1In dense graphs one may consider to use Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm [15],
[16]. Although it is computationally more complex, O(|N |3), its memory
complexity during computation is limited to the size of the input adjacency
matrix and output forwarding matrix (O(|N |2)).
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Figure 2: Node failure disjointness and labels used in forwarding
need special treatment until they reach their destination or a
shortest path that is not affected by the failure anymore. In the
latter case, the label may be removed.
The overall complexity of the algorithm is mostly defined
by the chosen shortest path algorithm. In general, our algo-
rithm has a worst-case complexity of O(|N |+ |L|) times the
complexity of the implemented shortest path algorithm, since
we need |N | iterations to derive the all-to-all forwarding table
and need to recompute broken shortest paths twice for all
|L| links. Our solution optimizes shortest and backup path
length in sequential order. Hence, it does not include Quality-
of-Service constraints. Such functionality can be implemented
by computing primary paths using a multi-constrained path
algorithm (e.g. [17]), and subsequently computing the backup
paths compared based on the remaining set of resources. The
implementation and evaluation of this solution, however, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Node-failure disjoint paths
In the case of a node failure, Algorithm 1 may not work as
the node opposite to the detected broken link is not excluded
from the backup path. Figure 2a shows how the selection of
a link-disjoint path may send packets right back towards the
broken node. Even if node F would select its link-disjoint
backup path towards node H2, this path is not guaranteed
to be loop-free from a previous backup path. As suggested
in figure 2b, in the case of a node failure we need a node-
disjoint backup path that eliminates the failed node instead of
individual links from the backup paths. Algorithm 2 presents
our solution that computes primary and backup forwarding
rules for all-to-all paths given that at most one node is broken.
The algorithm computes primary and backup forwarding rules
resilient to any single node failure. The algorithm is almost
equal to Algorithm 1, except for minor changes. The biggest
change is found in lines 5 and 6, where instead of the
removal of link l, its opposite node nR is removed from the
shadow copy. The stored label nR is used in forwarding. The
computational complexity remains unchanged.
C. Hybrid approach
The biggest problem with link-failure disjoint paths is that
they may show problems when the node opposite of the
detected failed link is broken. The node that detects link failure
cannot determine whether the link failure is a result of a
single link failure or node failure that affects all the failed
node’s links. The trivial solution to use node-failure disjoint
paths whenever possible may work, but implies longer backup
paths as one cannot return to the opposite node when it is still
functional and may break connectivity when there is no node-
disjoint path available. In practice, link failures occur more
than node-failures. Although the node asserting the backup
path cannot know whether a link or node failure is present,
we prefer a link-failure disjoint path whenever possible, and
a node-disjoint path otherwise.
In order to accomplish such routing, as depicted in figure
3, we let the asserting node assume a link-failure and act
accordingly to it by adding a label denoting link-failure and
forwarding through the link-failure disjoint path. If any node
along this backup path has a primary forwarding rule to the
failed node through another of its links, it assumes node failure
based on the local link-failure detection combined with the
label on the incoming packets indicating it is not the first
broken link of that node. Furthermore, this knowledge is added
to the attached label. When every attached label of a failed
link is a concatenation of its interconnecting nodes ({u, v}),
a forwarding rule wildcard match such as {∗, v} can detect
previous link failures to node v.
To compute these rules, we compute both node- and link-
failure disjoint paths and place these using their unique labels
in the shared forwarding matrix. Note that the initial forward-
ing matrix only needs to be computed once, and removal of
links and nodes and their respective recomputations may occur
sequentially. This procedure runs in the same worst-case time
complexity as the previous two algorithms.
D. Routing Table Optimization
The procedures described in the previous subsections looks
for min-min link-, node- and hybrid-failure disjoint paths.
However, without optimizing forwarding rule complexity, this
results in a state explosion of forwarding rules. While the real-
istic USnet topology (shown in figure 4) initially has a total of
552 forwarding rules (23 per switch, one for each destination),
our link-, node- and hybrid-failure disjoint approaches change
most of these from regular output actions to group tables and
5H1
H2
A
B C
D
E F G
Primary Path
Secondary Path
[H2]
[H2]
[H2]
[H2,
BC]
[H2,C]
[H2,C]
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respectively leads to 1606, 2078 and 3684 (sum of previous
two) additional entries in the forwarding matrix fw. Although
switches often have very large forwarding tables for Layer
2 matching, the number of TCAM entries in a switch for
multiple field matches as performed in OpenFlow lies in the
order of 1000 to 10000 rules [18]. Hence, it is necessary to
minimize the number of forwarding rules to allow applicability
in larger networks.
Considering that detoured packets at a certain point follow
the default shortest paths from intermediate nodes on the
backup path to destination, unaffected by the found failure, a
first optimization is found by removing the failure-identifying
label once a suitable default shortest path is found, leading to
an addition of only 487 and 576 node- or link-failure disjoint
entries, which is a big improvement. Since the hybrid-failure
disjoint path may not revert to a shortest path before a potential
node-failure is omitted, we find an additional 1293 hybrid-
failure disjoint entries, which, although larger than the sum of
the previous two, is still a factor three lower than before.
Moreover, if we consider the USnet topology to be un-
weighted, hence introducing multiple shortest paths, we find an
additional 621 and 741 node- and link-failure disjoint entries,
which is larger than its weighted counter result, indicating
that it is important for resilience in a network to have unique
shortest paths.
We further optimize rulespace utilization by removing link-
failure disjoint forwarding rules in the hybrid computation
when they are equal to their respective node-failure disjoint
rule, leading to a decreased number of 847 additional entries.
A more extensive evaluation of our proposal compared to fully
disjoint paths is presented in section IV.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we study the performance of our algo-
rithms through simulation in three network topologies, Erdös-
Rényi random networks [19], lattice networks, and Waxman
networks [20]. For our generated Erdös-Rényi random net-
works, we choose 2log|N ||N | as the probability for link existence,
since the network will almost surely be connected when the
probability for link existence exceeds (1+E)log|N ||N | , where E>0.
In the lattice network, all interior nodes have a degree of
four and the exterior nodes are connected to their closest
exterior neighboring nodes. The lattice network is useful in
Figure 4: USnet topology with 24 nodes and 43 links
representing grid-based networks, which may resemble the
inner core of an ultra-long-reach optical data plane system
[21]. We choose a square lattice network of i× i dimension,
where i =
√|N |, for our generated lattice networks. The
Waxman network is frequently used to model communication
networks and the Internet topology [22], due to its unique
property of decaying link existence over distance. In the
Waxman network, nodes are uniformly positioned in the plane,
and link existence is reflected by ie
`uv
ja , where `uv is the
Euclidean distance between nodes u and v, a is the maximum
distance between any two nodes in the plane, and i and j can
vary between 0 to 1. We set i = 0.5 and j = 0.5 since higher
i leads to higher link densities, and lower j leads to shorter
links. We consider only two-connected generated graphs, such
that the network can never be disconnected by a single node or
link failure. In the Erdös-Rényi and lattice networks, each link
has a random link weight between 0 and 1. No self-loops or
parallel links are allowed. Simulations were conducted on an
Intel(R) Core i7-3770K 3.50 GHz machine with 16GB RAM
memory, and all results are averaged over a 1000 runs and
grouped by the network sizes 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81 and
100 due to the dimension of the lattice network.
We compute and compare the results of different disjoint
algorithms, being our link-, node- and hybrid-failure disjoint
approaches and min-sum pairs of fully link- and node-disjoint
paths. More specifically, we measure:
1) the total number of flow entries
2) the amount of flow entries that forward to a Group table
entry
3) the number of distinct Group table entries
4) the average primary path length
5) the averages of
a) the average, minimal and maximal backup path
length for each node pair and
b) the average, minimal and maximal crankback
length for experienced backup paths.
We compute link-, node- and hybrid-failure disjoint paths
according to our approach and link- and node-disjoint paths
according to Bhandari’s algorithm2 for the generated networks,
and calculate the enumerated values for these paths.
Figure 5 presents the average number of Flow table entries
for each generated network. A regular shortest paths com-
2Note that any other min-sum disjoint paths algorithm renders the same
results, given that solutions are unique or an equal tossing method is used.
6Table I: Results for the evaluated algorithms and networks of network size N = 100
Network Disjoint Flow Entries Distinct Groups Primary
Path Ratio
Backup
Path Ratio
- Min - Max Crankback
Ratio
- Max
Erdös-Rényi Link 106852.298 1908.580 1.014 2.146 1.419 2.787 0.363 0.684
Erdös-Rényi Node 106632.844 1913.405 1.015 1.956 1.434 2.402 0.261 0.484
Erdös-Rényi Link-Failure 10160.248 1187.016 1.000 1.512 1.218 1.887 0.035 0.123
Erdös-Rényi Node-Failure 10149.929 1096.475 1.000 1.471 1.254 1.733 0.024 0.079
Erdös-Rényi Hybrid-Failure 11451.396 1388.225 1.000 1.547 1.277 1.914 0.023 0.076
Lattice Link 207585.132 1002.772 1.039 2.259 1.369 3.101 0.445 0.866
Lattice Node 207642.592 1006.752 1.050 2.190 1.403 2.919 0.394 0.758
Lattice Link-Failure 10381.567 571.113 1.000 1.283 1.095 1.525 0.016 0.088
Lattice Node-Failure 10663.192 542.702 1.000 1.308 1.127 1.538 0.012 0.065
Lattice Hybrid-Failure 12320.495 735.551 1.000 1.331 1.131 1.612 0.013 0.067
Waxman Link 50885.088 6208.709 1.000 1.570 1.049 2.105 0.260 0.528
Waxman Node 50572.606 6247.912 1.000 1.359 1.147 1.576 0.106 0.214
Waxman Link-Failure 9900 3874.098 1.000 1.070 1.032 1.117 0.000 0.001
Waxman Node-Failure 9900 3268.110 1.000 1.152 1.139 1.166 0.000 0.000
Waxman Hybrid-Failure 13671.039 4660.458 1.000 1.163 1.147 1.180 0.000 0.000
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Figure 5: Average number of Flow entries in each network,
categorized per network type and disjoint computation and
incrementally stacked per network size
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Figure 6: Ratio of forwards to Group table entries for Erdös-
Rényi generated random networks of size N = 100 nodes
putation always generates exactly |N |(|N | − 1) Flow table
entries (from each node to each other node). This number
increases when more complex path computations are used.
Specifically, we see a strikingly high increase in Flow table
entries when fully-disjoint paths are used, which is caused by
the fact that each forwarding rule has to take both source and
destination into account for primary path forwarding, as well
as the incoming port for crankback routing. As also shown in
table I, our failure-disjoint proposal shows an increase in Flow
table entries varying from 15.7% to 38% for a network size of
N = 100 nodes, whereas for the fully-disjoint computations
this is limited from no increase to 7.7%. Given that fully-
disjoint paths lead to an increased table usage by a factor
of 21, our method appears to be much more conservative in
Flow table usage. Whereas we found that our proposal uses
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Figure 7: Average number of distinct Group Entries in each
network, categorized per network type and of disjoint compu-
tation and incrementally stacked per network size
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Figure 8: Increase in primary path per network size, catego-
rized by algorithm and network type.
significantly less flow table entries, figure 6 shows up to 94%
of these are forwarded to Group table entries compared to a
worst case of 44% for a fully disjoint path. Although this looks
like a significant increase, the absolute number of Flow entries
forwarding to Group table entries remains much lower in all
cases. Moreover, table I and figure 7 show that our proposal
contains a significantly lower usage of distinct Group table
entries in each network, which are considered scarce resources.
Besides a smaller configuration complexity, also the primary
paths taken are better. While the primary path in our proposal
always defaults to the shortest path, figure 8 shows that using
fully-disjoint paths leads to an increase of primary path lengths
of up to 5.0%, and thus incurs higher network operation
costs. Although the increase of primary path length of disjoint
paths in most cases grows and at a certain point seems to
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Figure 10: Comparison between minimal, average and maxi-
mal relative backup path lengths for networks of size N = 100
stabilize, with Waxman generated networks the path increase
decreases over time implying that the design of the network
has implications for the relative cost of robustness.
Figure 9 shows that besides a shorter primary path, our
proposal on average also has significantly shorter average
backup paths. In order to determine the average backup path
for a node pair, we took its primary path and for each link
or node on the path computed the length of the path if that
specific link or node would fail and averaged accordingly.
Hence, as figure 10 shows, the average backup path deviates
significantly based on the link that fails. Especially the fully-
disjoint paths suffer from a high deviation due to the high
order of crankback routing that is involved when a link
further down the primary path breaks. Figures 11 and 12
additionally show that the ratio and deviation of crankback
paths is much larger for fully-disjoint paths than for our
approach. Furthermore, crankback paths only exist temporarily
in our proposal, since the controller reconfigures the network
by applying the protection scheme to its newly established
topology once it is notified of the failure, thereby removing
existing crankback subpaths from the shortest paths.
The hybrid-failure disjoint path lengths are only shown for a
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Figure 11: Average length of crankback paths relative to length
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Figure 12: Comparison between minimal, average and maxi-
mal relative crankback lengths for networks of size N = 100
node failure, since the path lengths for a respective link failure
are equal to the results in the link-disjoint approach by design.
Although the number of Flow and Group table entries, as well
as the secondary path and crankback length for node failures
slightly increases in the hybrid-failure approach, we claim this
number is justified by the merits of shorter paths for the more
often occurring link failures.
Although no exact measurements were made, we found
that our proposal had a much faster computation time than
its fully-disjoint counterpart. Our hybrid approach in general
took 4 seconds to finish, compared to 20 seconds in Lattice
networks and even up to a minute in Erdös-Rényi and Waxman
generated networks for the fully-disjoint approach. Hence, our
implementation is much faster in computing a new network
configuration that offers protection from a possible next fail-
ure.
V. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
In order to evaluate failure circumventing methods as de-
scribed in the previous two sections, we have implemented
an open-source prototype OpenFlow controller module that
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(a) The disjoint paths from H1 to H2 do not instruct node C how to handle
the link failure
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Figure 13: Disjoint paths and labels used in forwarding
configures a Software-Defined Network with such backup
rules.
We have used the Ryu controller framework [23] as basis
for our implementation, which loads and executes our network
application. The network topology is discovered by Ryu’s
built-in switches component, while host detection occurs by
a simple MAC learning procedure in our application.
Our application is OpenFlow 1.1+ [24] compatible, since
it depends on the Fast-Failover Group Tables to perform the
switchover to backup paths. Tests have been performed using
OpenFlow 1.3 [25] which is considered the current stable
version of OpenFlow.
We have used the NetworkX package [26] to perform graph
creation from the learned network topology and also used it
to perform further graph manipulations and computations. We
have extended the NetworkX package in the following ways:
• Cleaned up the shortest path algorithms
• Extended and standardized the (Queued) implementation
of the Bellman-Ford shortest-paths algorithm
• Implemented Bhandari’s disjoint-paths algorithm
• Implemented our failure-disjoint approach
The application configures the network according to our
protection scheme, enabling it to circumvent link or node
failures independent of (slow) controller intervention. After
the controller is notified of an occurred failure, it reapplies the
protection scheme to the new network topology, reestablishing
protection from future topology failure where possible. Re-
configuration occurs without traffic interruption using a Flow
entry update strategy as explained in [27]. Our additions to
NetworkX are contributed to its source code repository. Our
open-source OpenFlow controller is published on our GitHub
webpage [28].
VI. RELATED WORK
Disjoint paths, as depicted in figure 13a, are often used
to preprogram alternative paths for when the primary path
of a network connections breaks. A simple and intuitive
approach for finding such disjoint paths is by using Dijkstra’s
algorithm [12] iteratively [5]. At each iteration, all of the links
constituting the earlier {x}1≤x<k disjoint paths are removed
from the network (temporarily) before Dijkstra’s algorithm
[12] is used for finding the k-th disjoint path. However, this
iterative approach is but a heuristic and thus cannot always
return the optimal solution even when it exists (e.g., in the
presence of trap topologies [5]).
Suurballe [3] proposes an iterative scheme for finding k
one-to-one disjoint paths. At each iteration, the network is
(temporarily) transformed into an equivalent network such that
the network has non-negative link weights and zero-weight
links on the links of the shortest paths tree rooted at the source
node. Dijkstra’s algorithm can then be applied for finding the
k-th disjoint path from the knowledge of the earlier {x}1≤x<k
disjoint paths. Bhandari [29] later proposed a simplification of
Suurballe’s algorithm by an iterative scheme for finding the
k-th one-to-one disjoint path from the optimal solution of the
{x}1≤x<k disjoint paths. At each iteration, the direction and
algebraic sign of the link weight is reversed for each link of
the {x}1≤x<k disjoint paths. The network can thus contain
negative link weights. A modified Dijkstra’s algorithm [29] or
the Bellman-Ford algorithm [13], [14], both usable in networks
with negative link weights, can then be applied for finding the
k-th disjoint path.
Both Suurballe’s algorithm and Bhandari’s algorithm need
to be repeated |N |(|N | − 1) times for finding k disjoint
paths between each possible node pair, since both algorithms
return only the one-to-one directed min-sum disjoint paths
between two given nodes. The Suurballe-Tarjan algorithm [4]
has reduced worst-case time complexity for finding k = 2
disjoint paths from one source to all possible node pairs. The
Suurballe-Tarjan algorithm also uses the equivalent network
transformation of the Suurballe algorithm to ensure that the
network contains no negative link weights in each run of the
Dijkstra’s algorithm.
One of the disadvantages of using disjoint-paths based
protection is that the traffic needs to be transmitted again
from the source node using the backup path whenever the
primary path fails. For example, figure 13a shows that even
when node C detects the failure of link (C,D), node C has
no means of rerouting the packets intended for node H2 as it
is not aware of the backup path. The only way to resolve this
matter is to rely on crankback routing as depicted in figure 13b.
Crankback routing, as may be evident from the picture, implies
9a high network overhead. On the other hand, our proposed
algorithms enable traffic to be rerouted directly at the current
node whenever its adjacent link or node fails, thus saving time
and network resources.
There are also algorithms that propose protection schemes
based on (un)directed disjoint trees, e.g., the Roskind-Tarjan
algorithm [30] or the Medard-Finn-Barry-Gallager algorithm
[31]. The Roskind-Tarjan algorithm finds k all-to-all undi-
rected min-sum disjoint trees, while the Medard-Finn-Barry-
Gallager algorithm finds a pair of one-to-all directed min-sum
disjoint trees that can share links in the reverse direction.
Contrary to our work, their resulting end-to-end paths can
often be unnecessarily long, which may lead to higher failure
probabilities and higher network operation costs. A more
extensive overview of disjoint paths algorithms is presented
in [2].
In terms of work related to Software-Defined Networks,
Capone et al. [32] derive and compute an MILP formula-
tion for preplanning recovery paths including QoS metrics.
Their approach relies heavily on crankback routing, which
results in long backup paths and redundant usage of links
compared to our approach. Their follow-up work SPIDER
[33] implements the respective failure rerouting mechanism
using MPLS tags. The system relies heavily on OpenState
[34] to perform customized failure detection and data plane
switching, making it incompatible with existing networks and
available hardware switches. Furthermore, the system does not
distinguish between link and node failures as our approach
does.
IBSDN [35] achieves robustness through running a central-
ized controller in parallel with a distributed routing protocol.
Initially, all traffic is forwarded according to the controller’s
configuration. Switches revert to the path determined by the
traditional routing protocol once a link is detected to be down.
The authors omit crankback paths through crankback detection
using a custom local monitoring agent. The proposed system
is both elegant and simple, though does require customized
hardware, since switches need to connect to a central con-
troller, run a routing protocol, and implement a local agent to
perform crankback detection. Moreover, the time it takes the
routing protocol to converge to the post-failure situation may
be long and cannot outpace a preconfigured backup plan.
Braun et al. [36] apply the concept of Loop-Free Alternates
(LFA) from IP networks to SDNs, where nodes are prepro-
grammed with single-link backup rules when not creating
loops. Through applying an alternative loop-detection method
more backup paths are found than using traditional LFA,
although full protection requires topological adaptations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have derived, implemented and evaluated
algorithms for computing an all-to-all network forwarding
configuration capable of circumventing link and node failures.
Our algorithms compute forwarding rules that include failure-
disjoint backup paths offering preprogrammed protection from
future topology failures. Through packet labelling we guar-
antee correct and loop-free detour forwarding. The labeling
technique allows packets to return on primary paths unaffected
by the failure and carries information used to upgrade link-
failures to node-failures when applicable. Furthermore, we
have implemented a proof-of-concept network controller that
configures OpenFlow-based SDN switches according to this
approach, showing that these types of failover techniques can
be applied to production networks.
Compared to traditional link- or node-disjoint paths, our
method shows to have significantly shorter primary and backup
paths. Furthermore, we observe significantly less crankback
routing when backup paths are activated in our approach.
Besides shorter paths, our approach outperforms traditional
disjoint path computations in terms of respectively the needed
Flow and Group table configuration entries by factors up to
20 and 1.9. Our approach allows packets that encounter a
broken link or node along their path, to travel the second-to-
shortest path to their destination taken from the node where
the link or node failure is detected. We apply Software-
Defined Networking, specifically the OpenFlow protocol, to
configure computer networks according to the derived protec-
tion scheme, allowing them to continue functioning without
(slow) controller intervention. After the network controller is
notified of the link or node failure it reconfigures the network
by applying the protection scheme to its newly established
topology, therewith reassuring protection from future topology
failure within reasonable time.
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